UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25515
2 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 1 APRIL 1993 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

We have the honour to bring to your attention the text of the statement on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea issued on 1 April 1993 by the Depositary Governments of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

We should be most grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed)	(Signed)	(Signed)
Yuliy VORONTSOV Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation	Edward WALKER Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States of America	Sir David HANNAY KCMG Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Annex

Democratic People's Republic of Korea:
NPT Co-Depositaries Statement

The Governments of the Russian Federation, United Kingdom and the United States, which are the depositary Governments of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), wish to issue the following statement:

"We express regret and concern at the announcement by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) of its intention to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Since the NPT is an essential element of international peace and security, DPRK withdrawal from the NPT would constitute a serious threat to regional and international stability.

We question whether the DPRK's stated reasons for withdrawing from the Treaty constitute extraordinary events relating to the subject-matter of the Treaty. In this regard, we recall that nuclear-related security assurances have been provided to the DPRK as a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT.

Remaining a party to the Treaty and complying fully with its terms would be in the DPRK's interests. It would help to reassure the international community about the nature of the DPRK's nuclear programme and the DPRK's desire for positive international relations, including peaceful nuclear cooperation.

Moreover, DPRK withdrawal from the NPT would jeopardize stability on the Korean peninsula, which has improved in recent years, and undermine efforts to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

We urge the DPRK to retract its announcement and to comply fully with its Treaty commitments and its safeguards obligations, which remain in force. In this respect, we strongly support the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency to implement its safeguards agreement with the DPRK."

The three Governments call upon all NPT parties to associate themselves with this statement and to urge the DPRK to reconsider its position and to fulfil its commitment under the Treaty.

1 April 1993

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25516
2 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 2 APRIL 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to my letter of 7 January 1993 (S/25078) in which I reported to the members of the Security Council on the latest developments relating to the implementation of the provisions of the Peace Accords for El Salvador concerning the purification of the Armed Forces (S/23501, Annex Chapter I, Section III).

In that letter I stated that I had asked President Cristiani to take early action to regularize the position of 15 officers in respect of whom the Ad Hoc Commission's recommendations had not yet been implemented. I have since raised this matter on a number of occasions with President Cristiani.

On 31 March 1993 I received a visit from Dr. Oscar Santamaria, Minister of the Presidency of El Salvador, who had been sent by President Cristiani to New York to communicate to me the President's plan for regularizing the position of the 15 officers concerned. The following day my comments were communicated to President Cristiani who thereupon revised the plan. It now provides that all the officers concerned will, by 30 June 1993 at the latest, have been placed on leave with pay pending completion of the procedures for their retirement which will take place not later than 31 December 1993. While on leave with pay they will not perform any official functions.

I have again concluded that this arrangement would, when implemented, bring the Government into broad compliance with the Ad Hoc Commission's recommendations, though I regret that this will not occur until a date several months later than that foreseen in the Agreements. However, I look forward to being able to confirm to the Security Council, shortly after 30 June 1993, that all the recommendations have finally been put into effect.

I should be grateful if you would bring this letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

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UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25517
2 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 2 APRIL 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Further to my letter of 18 March 1993 and the statement issued by the President on behalf of the members of the Security Council dated 26 March 1993 (S/25478), I am pleased to report to you and your colleagues in the Council about the outcome of my meetings with the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus.

As the members of the Council are aware, the two leaders had accepted my invitation to meet with me in New York on Tuesday, 30 March to discuss the timing, modalities and preparation for the resumption of substantive negotiations as mandated by the Security Council. I met separately with the two leaders on Tuesday morning. This was followed by a joint meeting on Tuesday afternoon. At the conclusion of that meeting my spokesperson issued a statement on the outcome of the joint meeting (see enclosed copy). I also hosted a working luncheon for the two leaders on Wednesday, 31 March.

I am pleased to inform you that the two leaders agreed to resume the joint negotiations on Monday, 24 May at United Nations Headquarters using the Set of Ideas for the purpose of reaching freely a mutually acceptable overall framework agreement. Furthermore, they agreed that the joint negotiations beginning on 24 May will be preceded by a preparatory process in which my representatives will meet with them in Nicosia to clarify and address the concerns of the two leaders related to the Set of Ideas with a view to facilitating progress at the resumed joint negotiations, as well as to discuss the implementation of confidence-building measures with a view to creating a new climate of confidence which will contribute to the success of the negotiating process.

I wish to assure you and the members of the Council that I will make every effort to move this process forward. In this connection, I emphasized to both leaders the expectation of the members of the Council that the resumed joint negotiations will result in significant progress, as well as their determination to remain seized of the Cyprus question on an ongoing basis and to lend their active support to my efforts.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Annex

PRESS RELEASE

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL MEETS WITH THE LEADERS OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES IN CYPRUS

The Secretary-General met jointly today with the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus at United Nations Headquarters. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the timing, modalities and preparations for the resumption of substantive direct negotiations as specifically mandated by the Security Council.

The two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to cooperate with the Secretary-General in the context of his mission of good offices. They expressed their willingness to resume the joint negotiations on Monday, 24 May 1993 at United Nations Headquarters using the Set of Ideas for the purpose of reaching freely a mutually acceptable overall framework agreement.

The joint negotiations will be preceded by a preparatory process in which the representatives of the Secretary-General will meet in Nicosia with the leaders of the two communities. The object of this preparatory process will be to clarify the specific concerns of the two leaders relating to the draft overall framework agreement contained in the Set of Ideas and to address those concerns with a view to facilitating progress at the resumed joint negotiations in New York. They will also discuss the implementation of confidence-building measures with a view to creating a new climate of confidence which will contribute to the success of the negotiating process.

The Secretary-General has welcomed the declared intentions of the two leaders to meet privately from time to time and to hold meetings with the heads of the political parties from both sides in parallel with the negotiations under his mission of good offices. He believes that such encounters can help overcome long-standing mutual distrust and can contribute to the success of both the preparatory process and the joint negotiations.

30 March 1993

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25518
2 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN MOZAMBIQUE

INTRODUCTION

1. After considering my report of 3 December 1992 (S/24892 and Corr.1 and Add.1), the Security Council by its resolution 797 (1992) of 16 December 1992 established a United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). The present report is in response to paragraphs 6 and 10 of that resolution, in which I was requested to keep the Security Council informed of developments, particularly of the timetable for the electoral process, and to submit a further report by 31 March 1993.

2. The specific mandate of ONUMOZ, as set out in paragraph 18 of my report of 3 December 1992 (S/24892) and approved by the Security Council in paragraph 1 of resolution 797 (1992), consists of four distinct but closely related sets of objectives: political, military, electoral and humanitarian. There has been progress in each of these areas, although not always rapidly enough for the demands of the situation.

I. DEPLOYMENT OF THE MILITARY COMPONENT OF THE OPERATION

3. The operational plan for ONUMOZ contained in my previous report to the Security Council provided for verification of cease-fire arrangements and other military aspects of the peace process in Mozambique to be carried out mainly by teams of United Nations military observers. These would work with, but remain separate from, the monitoring groups composed of representatives of the two Mozambican parties at each location. The General Peace Agreement (S/24635, annex) also required that the withdrawal of foreign troops begin upon the entry into force of the cease-fire. The Security Council approved my recommendation that ONUMOZ assume transitional responsibility for security in corridors in order to protect humanitarian convoys using them, until the formation of the Mozambican unified army. The ONUMOZ military component will need to have, in particular, five logistically self-sufficient units to carry out this responsibility.

4. Following the adoption of resolution 797 (1992), there was considerable debate in Mozambique on what it would mean to have United Nations troops present in the country, and especially about the effect on national sovereignty. It was

clear that time was needed to overcome uncertainties and resolve disagreements. This also resulted in considerable delay in the approval by both parties of the initial list of troop-contributing countries.

5. Furthermore, Mr. Dhlakama, the President of the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) wrote me on 7 January 1993 to say that he could not agree to the cantonment and demobilization of RENAMO troops until at least a substantial number of United Nations troops were deployed. He views their presence in certain RENAMO areas as a guarantee that another party could not take advantage of the demobilization of RENAMO forces. This interpretation of the United Nations military contingents' role goes beyond the intention of the original deployment plan and imposes new, unforeseen tasks on United Nations troops. As for the Government, it asked my Special Representative in January for a wider deployment of ONUMOZ forces so that the movements of RENAMO and government forces could be monitored equally.

6. Following his appointment as Force Commander of ONUMOZ, Major-General Lélio Gonçalves Rodrigues da Silva (Brazil) assumed his duties on 14 February 1993. Meanwhile, the delays in the approval of the list of troop-contributing countries resulted in the rotation of the ONUMOZ military observers only in the third week of January. By that time, only five of the original 25 military observers which had been mandated by Security Council resolution 782 (1992) of 13 October 1992 still remained in Mozambique. However, by mid-March some 154 military observers drawn from 12 countries were deployed at three regional headquarters (Nampula, Beira and Matola) and in Maputo. Of these, some 102 observers have been formed into teams and are ready to take up their assignments immediately in the assembly areas. In the meantime, ONUMOZ military observers are engaged in verification of cease-fire violations and limited monitoring and reconnaissance of the assembly areas. It should be noted, however, that the shortage of aircraft, vehicles, office accommodation and communication equipment limits their activities, for reasons mentioned in paragraph 46 below.

7. With regard to formed military units, much planning and preparation had been done in anticipation of their deployment. In March, reconnaissance parties from various troop-contributing countries inspected their respective deployment areas and completed assessments of their tasks and resources requirements. It is envisaged that infantry battalions will be allocated as follows: Nampula corridor - Bangladesh; Beira corridor - Italy; Tete corridor - Botswana; Limpopo corridor - Zambia; and National Highway - Uruguay. Support elements of engineers, logistics, movement control, communications, medical and air support will be deployed at ONUMOZ central and regional headquarters.

8. The phased induction plan for United Nations formed units has undergone several major adjustments. There have been administrative delays both within the United Nations, and also by troop-contributing countries. Although I began to approach potential contributors for the Mozambican operation as early as September, the final composition of ONUMOZ military units has not yet been completed. Some countries which several months ago signalled their intention to provide troops to this operation only recently informed the Secretariat of their readiness to dispatch them to Mozambique. I have directed that every effort be made to hasten the deployment of the ONUMOZ military component. The bulk of

infantry units will arrive in April, and the full deployment of the force should be complete in May 1993.

9. Meanwhile, a self-sufficient Italian contingent of approximately 1,030, which includes the infantry, a logistical subunit, a medical element and an air wing (which is being provided at no cost to the United Nations), has been completely deployed in the Beira corridor. This contingent became fully operational on 1 April 1993. An advance party of the Bangladeshi contingent has also arrived.

10. A major problem for ONUMOZ military deployment is the lack of freedom of movement. A status-of-forces agreement has yet to be approved. In its absence, ONUMOZ has to provide advance information on all movements of United Nations military personnel. This requirement imposes restrictions on the effectiveness of the mission.

II. ESTABLISHMENT OF ASSEMBLY AREAS AND DEMOBILIZATION

11. Under the terms of the General Peace Agreement (S/24635, annex), the cease-fire in Mozambique, which came into effect on 15 October 1992, was to be followed rapidly by the separation of the two sides' forces and their concentration in certain assembly areas. Of these, 29 were to be designated for the Government and 20 for RENAMO. Demobilization of those troops who would not serve in the Mozambican Defence Force (FADM) was to begin immediately thereafter. In practice, however, there has been little progress in implementing this crucial aspect of the General Peace Agreement, which affects the timetable of the whole peace process.

12. This delay has been caused by several factors. One is that the two parties have not yet provided ONUMOZ with the complete list of troop strength, arms, ammunition, mines and other explosives which was expected by 15 October 1992. The parties finally agreed that the assembly of troops would proceed in phases. The first phase would be cantonment in seven areas for the Government and five for RENAMO. Both parties, however, have designated their assembly locations not for logistical suitability, but for their importance for control over certain areas. Accordingly, assembly areas have had to be changed, often at the request of the United Nations, because the sites proposed by the parties were inaccessible, without services and water, or may have been mined. Another factor seriously affecting progress is RENAMO's insistence that the assembly and demobilization of its troops will depend on the size and deployment of United Nations forces.

13. At the beginning of January 1993, my Special Representative set up a technical unit to assist in the concentration and demobilization programme. This unit consists of civilian staff seconded from the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the European Community (EC), the Swiss Development Cooperation Agency and the International Organization for Migration. It will have a team in each assembly area which will act in close cooperation with the teams of military observers. Twelve areas can be opened as soon as logistical support is available.

14. Thanks to substantial donations from the European Community, Norway and Japan, the World Food Programme can now give a basic ration of food to all assembled troops. Arrangements to supply this food have been made. UNICEF will help provide wells, boreholes, pumps and engines and simple non-food items (soap, tarpaulins, blankets, cooking pots). United Nations Volunteers should be in each assembly location in a few weeks to organize the logistic support to the assembly areas and to guarantee communication with humanitarian agencies.

15. The technical unit is also preparing for demobilization. Civilian clothes for the demobilized have been procured. Registration procedures for the soldiers have been defined in coordination with the relevant government departments. The International Organization for Migration, in collaboration with the Mozambican Ministry of Transport and Communications, has begun to recruit specialists who will ensure in each province that demobilized soldiers and their families are transported to their places of origin. Thus, from the standpoint of logistical preparations, it would be possible to initiate the first phase of demobilization as soon as the Supervising and Monitoring Commission takes the appropriate decisions.

III. DEVELOPING THE POLITICAL PROCESS

16. The General Peace Agreement foresaw the creation of a series of commissions to monitor and implement the objectives set forth in the Agreement. At the invitation of the parties, the United Nations had agreed to chair the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission, as well as two of its subsidiary commissions, the Cease-fire Commission and the Reintegration Commission. The three Commissions were formally established and took up their functions last October shortly after the arrival of my Special Representative in Mozambique.

17. Since my report of 3 December 1992 (S/24892), the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission has held several meetings. Germany has also joined the Commission at the invitation of the parties. As a result, in addition to the two principals - the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO - the Commission comprises the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and six member countries: France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

18. It will be recalled that for the political process, the mandate of ONUMOZ as approved by Security Council resolution 797 (1992), and in accordance with the General Peace Agreement, is to facilitate impartially the implementation of the Agreement, particularly by chairing the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission and its subsidiary commissions. The Supervisory and Monitoring Commission has been able to guide and coordinate the work of its subsidiary commissions and to address and resolve disputes which could not be settled at their level. The Supervisory and Monitoring Commission has adopted its own rules of procedure, which also govern the work of its subsidiaries. In addition to the formal meetings, my Special Representative has met on a regular basis with each of the parties individually, as well as with the group of ambassadors representing the member countries on the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission.

19. The Cease-fire Commission has been the most active of the commissions. Although progress in implementing the cease-fire agreement has been slower than

anticipated, the Commission has been able to maintain an ongoing dialogue between the parties on the main issues of its mandate. In January 1993, the Cease-fire Commission was expanded to include Zimbabwe and Kenya, bringing the number of invited member countries to 10. However, except in the central region of the country, the subordinate bodies of the Cease-fire Commission, i.e. the regional cease-fire commissions and the assembly area monitoring groups, either have not yet been established or are not fully operational.

20. The Cease-fire Commission has discussed major issues that fall within its mandate. These include the composition and constitution of regional cease-fire commissions and assembly area monitoring groups; alleged violations of the cease-fire, mainly movements of troops by both sides; the nomination and reconnaissance of assembly areas, arrangements for demining of 28 priority roads to support the cease-fire agreement as well as humanitarian assistance activities; completion of a national mine-clearing plan; and establishment of a de-mining policy and coordination committee.

21. The discussions of the Cease-fire Commission on the mine-clearing problem have been particularly successful. It is estimated that there are some 2 million mines in Mozambique, some dating back to the colonial era. The Cease-fire Commission established a plan to initiate immediate mine-clearing activities on a number of roads that were essential for the provision of humanitarian assistance to affected populations. With the assistance of an expert provided by the United Nations, it also developed a national de-mining policy, setting national priorities and establishing professional standards.

22. One of the appealing features of the plan is its training component in preparation for a mine-clearing school. At a rate of 400 graduates per year, the school will enable some 1,200 to 2,000 Mozambicans, many of them demobilized soldiers, to acquire a skill which, unfortunately, will be in demand for many years to come. Several donor countries have come forward to support the plan financially, and the United Nations has initiated a technical assistance project in response.

23. The Cease-fire Commission has not been able to achieve all its tasks in the time the General Peace Agreement requires. The two parties have not yet supplied the complete list of troop strength, arms, ammunition, mines and other explosives which was expected by 15 October 1992. The plan for the withdrawal of foreign troops, which was to have been declared by 15 October, has not yet been drawn up because of the delay in the arrival of the formed United Nations contingents. As a result, no specific plans for the concentration of troops have been submitted by either party because RENAMO would not start the process before the arrival of the United Nations troops. So far, RENAMO members of the three regional cease-fire commissions have been positioned only in the Central Region (Beira).

24. The Reintegration Commission has been able to hold only one working session. RENAMO has since announced that its delegation to the Commission could not attend the meetings because there was no housing and logistic support for it. However, a series of proposals for the reintegration of demobilized soldiers into civil society have been developed by the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination and could be implemented once they were reviewed and approved by the Reintegration Commission.

25. The Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force comprises, in addition to the parties, France, Portugal and the United Kingdom. It has not yet had any formal meetings. The parties have so far not even identified their delegations. My Special Representative has repeatedly expressed his concern to the parties that the delay would affect the peace process. However, military delegations from Portugal have visited the country and outlined their potential contribution to the training of the new unified army. The United Kingdom has already prepared facilities in the region to train instructors for the new force. The member countries of the Joint Commission have met recently in Lisbon and planned a unified contribution to the creation of the Defence Force.

26. In addition to the formal meetings of the commissions, my Special Representative has established informal tripartite working meetings with the parties on both political and military subjects. These meetings address questions of common concern so as to agree on working procedures and other related issues.

27. As the work of the commissions chaired by the United Nations progresses, the need for the other commissions has become ever more apparent. The tasks assigned to each of the commissions are often closely related. As a result, the failure of some commissions to function hampers progress in those already established. In addition, certain questions of paramount importance to the peace process cannot be addressed unless the responsible commissions begin to act without further delay.

28. The National Police Affairs Commission and the National Information Commission have also yet to be established. So far, RENAMO has not been able to identify its representatives on those commissions. The urgency of this matter has become apparent in view of concerns by RENAMO that the Government has integrated military officers and soldiers into the police force. RENAMO's participation in the National Police Affairs Commission would, of course, permit this commission to function and thus to respond to these allegations. Similarly, complaints about human rights violations which should be addressed to these two commissions, as the General Peace Agreement provides, now go unheeded. Furthermore, several of the minor incidents reported to the Cease-fire Commission contained elements of civil crime which should be addressed by the National Police Affairs Commission.

29. Two other commissions whose roles are of major importance for the successful implementation of the Agreement, the National Elections Commission and the National Commission for Administrative Questions, have not yet been established. The delay in creating the National Commission for Administrative Questions has made it impossible to address sensitive issues concerning administration in both Government- and RENAMO-held areas. The implications of the absence of the National Elections Commission are discussed in paragraphs 38 to 44 below.

IV. HUMANITARIAN AID COORDINATION

30. In my report to the Security Council of 3 December 1992 (S/24892), I recommended that ONUMOZ include a United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination (UNOHAC) in Maputo. This would coordinate the international relief effort under the overall authority of the Special Representative. Its Director would also chair the separate Humanitarian Assistance Committee.

31. Following the decision of the Security Council to establish ONUMOZ, the Director of UNOHAC arrived in Maputo on 18 December. As an early step he integrated into UNOHAC the current operations of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Emergency Relief Operations. Since then the Office has filled half of its established posts, and seconded personnel from operational agencies are now part of the staff of UNOHAC.

32. UNOHAC's first task has been to follow up the conclusions and recommendations of the Donors Conference for Mozambique held in Rome on 15 and 16 December 1992. A report on the Conference, which recorded pledges and contributions in the amount of US$ 398.34 million, was circulated to the members of the Council in document S/25044.

33. The Rome meeting also helped to define the objectives of humanitarian assistance to Mozambique. This targets the needs of returning refugees and internally displaced persons, groups in severe distress from drought or acute poverty and demobilized soldiers. The overall goal is to help these groups return to their areas of origin. UNOHAC is now preparing, in consultation with the Government of Mozambique, a consolidated humanitarian assistance programme for 1993-1994, which is intended to describe clearly and completely the use of aid appropriations and the resources pledged at the Rome conference. The programme will be presented to a further donors meeting, probably in May.

34. Although the mid-term prospects are favourable, outside humanitarian assistance will be necessary for the next 18 months. The drought of several years has broken. In the country as a whole, rainfall has recently been above normal. However, the 1993 crop of staple cereals will be much less than normal because seeds and hard tools were lacking in the growing season.

35. Moreover, there are still 1.5 million refugees receiving assistance in neighbouring countries. Spontaneous returns rose sharply in the three months following the General Peace Agreement. This has now virtually stopped. A further repatriation of 1 million persons may be assisted by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in April. Within Mozambique, there are an estimated 3 to 4 million displaced persons.

36. An important humanitarian objective of the humanitarian component of ONUMOZ is, therefore, to help resettlement by promoting essential services at district and community levels. These include support to agricultural production, road repair, water supply and sanitation, health care and education. A second vital purpose is to respond rapidly to humanitarian requirements in RENAMO areas so as to help open up commerce and expand contacts between population groups long isolated by war.

37. To provide supplementary funds for these activities, a United Nations Trust Fund for Humanitarian Assistance to Mozambique has been established by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Contributions to the Fund have already been announced for the specific purpose of financing mine-clearing projects, as well as to support the demobilization process and the reintegration of displaced populations.

V. MONITORING OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS AND THE PROVISION OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE ELECTIONS

38. The General Peace Agreement committed the Government to: establish a National Elections Commission by mid-December 1992; draft and publish an Electoral Law by mid-January 1993 in consultation with RENAMO and other parties and after approval by the Assembly of the Republic; and seek technical and material support for the organization of elections.

39. On 26 March 1993, the Government distributed a draft Electoral Law to RENAMO and other political parties. A Multi-party Conference sponsored by the Government will meet on 20 April to discuss and complete the draft law. Only after this conference will the Government submit the Electoral Law for approval by the Assembly of the Republic and set up the National Elections Commission; there are no firm deadlines for these last two actions.

40. Resolution 797 (1992) gives the United Nations the main coordinating role for technical assistance to the entire electoral process in Mozambique through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and other United Nations agencies. This role was endorsed by the Donors Conference for Mozambique held in Rome on 15 and 16 December. From 29 November to 13 December, a joint mission of the United Nations and the European Community worked with elements of the Government of Mozambique responsible for preparing the electoral process until the National Elections Commission is established.

41. The joint mission revised the overall elections budget and its detailed justification. It also formulated a draft project for integrated support to the electoral process under UNDP coordination. Both this project and the electoral budget were reviewed with the local donor community. In addition, the EC team assisted the Government of Mozambique in revising and finalizing a draft electoral law; prepared a report for the Rome Donors Conference on electoral organization; assessed requirements for logistics, civic education and training; and designed the future organization and functional responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat for the Administration of Elections.

42. UNDP and the EC have since maintained especially close consultations and cooperation in support of the electoral process. The EC has already committed itself to provide significant funds to finance registration materials, and also part of the technical assistance in the elections budget.

43. The timetable for holding the elections is now seriously in question. Relevant aspects of the political, military and humanitarian situations, and of the state of electoral preparations, have been mentioned above. An additional complicating factor is the season of intense rain which lasts from mid-November to late March.

44. It now seems clear that it will not be possible to conduct the elections according to the original timetable, which aimed to complete them during the 1993 dry season. In particular, as I emphasized in my previous report (S/24892), the military situation must be fully under control if we are to create the conditions for a successful election. This in turn depends upon a determined effort by the Mozambican parties to honour fully their commitments. As reported herein, they have yet to do this, although there have been some promising early steps.

VI. ADMINISTRATION, LOGISTICS AND STATUS-OF-FORCES AGREEMENT

45. In various parts of the present report, I have already pointed to some administrative causes for delays in the full deployment of ONUMOZ.

46. The formulation of a budget, given the present uncertain political situation together with the multifaceted components of the mission, proved to be a very complex task and required considerable internal consultations. Since only a relatively limited advance of US$ 9.5 million was made available pending the approval of the whole budget, the purchase of most equipment, as well as the long-term leasing of aircraft and lease of office space, had to be deferred. The lack of an approved budget also prevented the timely recruitment and deployment of many key personnel.

47. In view of the delays in the timetable of the implementation of various aspects of the General Peace Agreement, the General Assembly decided to appropriate a lump sum amount of US$ 140 million for ONUMOZ for the period from 15 October through 30 June 1993. Therefore, it is only now that the requisitioning for many items of equipment could start. It is also necessary to emphasize that in order to make optimal and efficient use of resources, ONUMOZ should purchase goods and services, including those related to its de-mining activities, from sources of supply in southern Africa whenever these are more economical than sources of supply elsewhere.

48. Still, these logistic concerns are not the only ones. The mission has experienced serious problems with the provision of office accommodation without cost to the United Nations and of some very basic services to ONUMOZ. The mission has therefore had to attempt to negotiate on the open market, but the results have not usually been very satisfactory, due to the inadequacy of the market itself.

49. Of specific concern to me also is the absence of a status-of-forces agreement on ONUMOZ, which is referred to in paragraph 10 above. Such a draft agreement was prepared on the basis of the model contained in document A/45/594, based upon established practice and drawing extensively upon prior and current agreements. At the present time, the movement of United Nations staff and goods is subject to Mozambican law. Consequently, ONUMOZ is required to obtain authorization for its flights, airport duties have to be paid, vehicles have to be registered locally and local taxes and duties are levied in accordance with national practice. Difficulties are experienced in the operation of ONUMOZ-chartered aircraft.

50. The United Nations is not asking for privileges, exemptions and immunities greater than those which are usually granted by other countries to the Organization in similar circumstances. The current practice regrettably imposes restrictions on the full implementation of ONUMOZ's mandate. Moreover, the approved budget of the mission does not include allowance for customs duties, excise taxes, levies, fees and other charges which the Government, its agents and local authorities are charging ONUMOZ.

VII. OBSERVATIONS

51. The General Peace Agreement signed in Rome consists of a complex series of interlinked agreements. These are to be implemented in stages through coordinated actions of the two parties - the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO - under United Nations verification. Some of the aspects of the peace accords also involve the active participation and support of Member States, and their contributions continue to be invaluable. The peace process is, however, an extremely complicated one. Thus, delay in implementing one element of the General Peace Agreement affects the achievement of others.

52. Any assessment of the current situation must include a number of positive developments. The cease-fire has largely held and the parties have continued to exercise restraint. Mozambique is going through a period without precedent in the past 16 years. After so many years of devastating conflict, there is a strongly felt need for peace. Mozambicans long for a return to the stability that will permit the rehabilitation and reconstruction of their society. I hope that this sentiment will strongly impel the parties to implement the peace accords fully and without further delay.

53. Another positive development relates to the understandings reached on the Zimbabwean and Malawian troops in the country who have been assisting in keeping open the transport corridors which run across Mozambique to neighbouring land-locked countries. The delay in the deployment of ONUMOZ contingents raised concerns at the beginning of the year that the premature withdrawal of these troops might cause the breakdown of the peace process. Fortunately, diplomacy and sound judgement prevailed: arrangements were worked out to permit these troops to remain in the corridors beyond the time specified in the General Peace Agreement.

54. But even if all these developments give cause for satisfaction, there are several reasons for concern which should not be underestimated. Many of the timetables established in the General Peace Agreement proved to be unrealistic. The number of considerable delays has accumulated and there are so far no signs to indicate that this time lost can be recovered quickly or easily. Some time has been lost in forging the necessary support inside the country to implement the Agreement. Continuing deep mistrust has resulted in reluctance to begin assembly and demobilization of troops, and has contributed to the delay in the deployment of United Nations military observers.

55. Another complication was Mr. Dhlakama's insistence that his troops would not assemble unless 65 per cent of the United Nations armed components were deployed and were ensuring stability in areas under RENAMO control. This interpretation obviously goes beyond the provisions of the General Peace

Agreement and the operational plan of ONUMOZ. Meanwhile, RENAMO's reluctance to allow timely investigation of alleged cease-fire violations and insistence on keeping certain areas under its control obstruct the freedom of movement of people and goods foreseen in the Agreement.

56. The delays in deployment of ONUMOZ's formed units also have not been helpful. There are several reasons for such delays, many of a gereric nature, which also inhibit other peace-keeping operations. The United Nations clearly needs more rapid and effective means as well as more flexible practices. The example of ONUMOZ also demonstrates the importance of quick responses by troop-contributing countries to United Nations requests. This aspect has become one of the crucial elements the Secretariat is usually faced with at the initial stages of many peace-keeping undertakings.

57. ONUMOZ's logistical problems also arise from the lack of a status-of-forces agreement. The latter must be finalized quickly so that the mission may freely and effectively carry out its mandate. I have received the personal assurances of Foreign Minister Mocumbi, with whom I met on 31 March, that the agreement will be signed by the Government without further delay.

58. It is essential to have the necessary conditions to allow RENAMO to assume a proper role in the political and social life of Mozambique. This is a serious problem which has to be resolved by the Mozambicans as soon as possible, if the peace process is to succeed. I welcome the cooperative approach of various donor countries which are assisting my Special Representative in his efforts to resolve these difficulties imaginatively and quickly.

59. The timetable for the implementation of the cease-fire arrangements, including the assembly of troops and their demobilization, cannot be delayed any longer. Soldiers should be able to begin returning to civilian life through the programmes envisaged in the General Peace Agreement. The parties must promptly exchange all relevant information concerning the numbers of their troops, their concentration points and assembly areas. To avoid unnecessary hardship for soldiers as well as to mitigate related security and social risks, consideration should be given by the parties to the need for starting the demobilization process before all troops are assembled under United Nations supervision. The main responsibility for the speedy implementation of all these matters related to the cease-fire lies with the Mozambicans themselves.

60. Formation of the new armed forces must also have high priority. I appeal to both parties, and to interested countries which have agreed to assist, to complete as soon as possible all arrangements for the training of the FADM. ONUMOZ is prepared to assist the parties in addressing this and other issues in order to help dispel mistrust and misunderstanding that could threaten the peace process.

61. Security concerns raised by both parties must be addressed without making the peace process hostage to exaggerated complaints or mistrust. The prompt deployment of the ONUMOZ military contingent should help to allay most of these apprehensions. I would be prepared also to consider some adjustments to the military operation by providing additional patrols and observation outside assembly areas and transport corridors, without substantially changing the approved mandate of the mission. ONUMOZ military elements would also undertake,

whenever possible, to verify unauthorized internal and cross-border flows of arms and military personnel. However, for the United Nations force to operate effectively, both sides must honour their commitments to guarantee ONUMOZ's freedom of movement and verification capabilities.

62. My Special Representative has, on many occasions, raised the above matters with both parties. Under-Secretary-General James O. C. Jonah also discussed these and other matters with both President Chissano and Mr. Dhlakama when he visited Mozambique last January. On 31 March, I reviewed in detail various aspects of the peace process with Foreign Minister Mocumbi. The two parties have on various occasions, even very recently, reaffirmed their firm commitment to consider peace as an irreversible choice. The possibility of a meeting between President Chissano and Mr. Dhlakama, repeatedly sought by my Special Representative, was recently brought up again by Mr. Dhlakama, and accepted by President Chissano. This meeting, like others in the past, could represent an important opportunity to contribute to the solution of outstanding problems.

63. All the delays and difficulties, however, will seriously affect the timetable previously presented to the Security Council. Although a draft Electoral Law has now been circulated, the delays in doing so will require adjustment of the timetables, particularly the dates for the elections. It is evident that they cannot be held in October 1993 as originally scheduled. I will continue my discussions with the parties on new dates and shall keep the Council informed about this very important matter.

64. Mozambique is now enjoying relative peace. The problems in implementing the General Peace Agreement cannot obscure this fundamental fact. Peace must be sustained and secured. The international community should continue to assist the parties in Mozambique in achieving this goal. Many of the initial problems experienced by the United Nations in establishing ONUMOZ and making it fully operational have now been or will soon be overcome. For my part, I am determined to continue my efforts to accelerate the process of implementation. Despite the many concerns which now preoccupy us all, with the continued goodwill of the parties and the interest and support of the international community, it should be possible in the coming crucial period to build on the progress made so far and firmly implant the peace process in Mozambique, and bring it to a final success.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25519
3 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 2 APRIL 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey to you, for the information of the members of the Security Council, a letter which the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees addressed to the Secretary-General this evening. It describes the disturbing situation which has developed in Srebrenica in eastern Bosnia following the decision of the Bosnian Serb military authorities not to permit any further aid to be delivered to that town.

The Force Commander of UNPROFOR has been instructed this evening to take this matter up immediately with the Bosnian Serb leadership and, in the Secretary-General's name, to insist that UNHCR be permitted to resume delivery of aid to Srebrenica. The results of General Wahlgren's démarche will be communicated to you as soon as possible. Meanwhile, the members of the Security Council may wish to consider what supportive action they might take in this extremely worrying situation.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Annex

Letter dated 2 April 1993 from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees addressed to the Secretary-General

Further to my letter of 18 March 1993, I would like to draw your attention to the extremely dramatic plight of the people in Srebrenica.

The population of Srebrenica town has swollen from 6,000 persons to 20-30,000 persons, with another 30,000 persons in the surrounding area. Despite the recent cease-fire and the airdrops, the humanitarian situation continues to be dire, and worsening by the hour. People are in desperate need of food, medicine, clothes and shelter material. Many of them are living on the streets, without any shelter or adequate clothing, exposed to winter conditions. You have already received the report from WHO on the very precarious health situation in Srebrenica. Most of the population is suffering from skin disease, many people have respiratory and intestinal infections. There are thousands of women and children who are weak, exhausted and starving.

Even under normal circumstances the infrastructure of Srebrenica could not support its current population, more than 75 per cent of whom are refugees from other areas in eastern Bosnia. Many of these refugees have had to flee several times from advancing Bosnian Serb forces. It is their conviction that the Bosnian Serbs will pursue their military objective to gain control of Srebrenica, and that the cease-fire will not hold. They are desperate to escape to safety because they see no other prospect than death if they remain where they are. Recent reports indicate that thousands of people have already begun to move towards Zepa under extremely dangerous conditions.

Only three UNHCR aid convoys have been able to reach the besieged town of Srebrenica in the past fortnight (on 19, 28 and 30 March). We were allowed by the Serbs to bring in food and medicine but not shelter material. The departing trucks were forced to evacuate over 5,560 women, children and elderly to Tuzla, as well as several hundred wounded persons.

Our efforts have met with serious difficulties. Firstly, despite measures taken by the local authorities to contain the situation, our convoys were stampeded by people desperate to flee Srebrenica by any means. In that process, several people were crushed to death. We ended up transporting a far larger number of people than planned. Secondly, despite the desperation of the people to leave, the Bosnian authorities in Tuzla as well as in Srebrenica are opposed to continued evacuation of people, which they see as designed to empty the town of its women and children in order to facilitate a subsequent Serbian offensive. Also the existing facilities in Tuzla are inadequate to absorb the new arrivals. Thirdly, yesterday we were informed by General Mladic of the Bosnian Serb military that he would not permit any more aid to be brought into Srebrenica, but would allow UNHCR to continue the evacuation only. This is unacceptable and contradicts his earlier assurances to UNHCR and UNPROFOR to allow access to humanitarian aid. My Special Envoy for the former Yugoslavia is pursuing negotiations on this matter.

UNHCR had planned to send another convoy to Srebrenica today, but because of delays at the border crossing-point, it has been postponed until tomorrow. Even if the convoy is able to bring some aid and can evacuate some people without untoward incidents, we are forced to acknowledge that the current efforts are totally inadequate to address the increasing human suffering.

Under these circumstances, I believe we are faced with two options, if we are to save the lives of the people trapped in Srebrenica. The first is to immediately enhance international presence, including that of UNPROFOR, in order to turn the enclave into an area protected by the United Nations, and inject life-sustaining assistance on a scale much greater than being permitted at the moment. Such an option would require the strongest political pressure from the international community on the Serbian side. Failing that, the only other option would be to organize a large-scale evacuation of the endangered population in Srebrenica. This would require the cooperation of all parties concerned, in particular that of the Bosnian authorities, as well as massive operational support to UNHCR to ensure that the evacuation can be conducted in a manner in which it does not endanger the very lives of those it is meant to save.

As time is running out, more drastic action needs to be taken urgently to ensure the survival of the population in Srebrenica. This cannot be achieved under the current conditions which do not allow UNHCR to do more than send in a very limited number of convoys which are neither adequate in meeting the humanitarian needs of the people nor in evacuating all those who wish to leave.

While I have instructed my Special Envoy to make every effort to increase our operational capacity to aid the population in Srebrenica, I wish to solicit your strong support to draw the attention of the international community, including the Security Council, to the help needed to carry out the essential measures. May I also seek your advice on what further steps can be taken to address this humanitarian tragedy in eastern Bosnia?

(Signed) Sadako OGATA

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25520
3 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Following consultations with the members of the Security Council, the President of the Council made the following statement, on behalf of the Council, at its 3192nd meeting, on 3 April 1993, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina":

"The Security Council is shocked by and extremely alarmed at the dire and worsening humanitarian situation which has developed in Srebrenica in the eastern part of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina following the unacceptable decision of the Bosnian Serb party not to permit any further humanitarian aid to be delivered to that town, and to allow only evacuation of its civilian population. The relevant facts are contained in a letter dated 2 April 1993, addressed to the Secretary-General by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (S/25519, annex).

"The Security Council recalls and reaffirms all its relevant resolutions and statements and condemns the continuing disregard and wilful flouting of the relevant Security Council resolutions and statements by the Bosnian Serb party, which once again, in pursuit of its unlawful, unacceptable and abhorrent policy of "ethnic cleansing" aimed at territorial aggrandisement, has blocked the United Nations humanitarian relief efforts.

"Recognizing the imperative need to alleviate, with the utmost urgency, the sufferings of the population in and around Srebrenica who are in desperate need of food, medicine, clothes and shelter, the Security Council demands that the Bosnian Serb party, cease and desist forthwith from all violations of international humanitarian law, including in particular the deliberate interference with humanitarian convoys, and allow all such convoys unhindered access to the town of Srebrenica and other parts in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Security Council demands that the Bosnian Serb party strictly comply with all relevant resolutions of the Security Council. It further demands that the Bosnian Serb party honour forthwith its most recent commitment "to guarantee the free movement of humanitarian convoys and the protection of endangered civilians". The Security Council also reaffirms that those guilty of crimes against international humanitarian law will be held individually responsible by the world community.

"The Security Council commends and strongly supports the efforts of the brave people who have undertaken to deliver urgently needed humanitarian assistance, under extremely trying conditions, to the civilian population in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in particular the efforts of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).

"The Security Council recalls the request it made in its statement of 3 March 1993 (S/25361) to the Secretary-General to take immediate steps to increase UNPROFOR's presence in eastern Bosnia; welcomes the action taken already in that respect; and urges the Secretary-General and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to use all the resources at their disposal within the scope of the relevant resolutions of the Council to reinforce the existing humanitarian operations in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

"The Security Council will remain actively seized of the matter."